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NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a claim for property damage
caused by flooding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury trial, on the issue of liability, was had in
the District Court commencing March 4, 1974. At the
conclusion of the evidence each of the defendants moved
for a directed verdict. These motions were denied and
the case was given to the jury upon a special verdict
requiring answers to 16 interrogatories (R. 721).
Based upon the answers returned by the jury, the
court entered judgment as follows :
1. Judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against
the State of Utah.
2. Judgment in favor of Salt Lake County and
against the plaintiffs.
3. Judgment in favor of Gibbons & Reed and
against the plaintiffs.
4. Judgment in favor of Gibbons & Reed and
against the State of Utah and Salt Lake County on the
crossclaims of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County
(R.743).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, State of Utah, seeks a reversal of the
lower court order granting judgment against it and
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also a reversal of the judgment on its crossclaim against
Gibbons & Eeed.
Defendant, Salt Lake County, seeks an affirmance
of the judgment entered in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in appellants' brief is substantially accurate, although incomplete, and additional
facts are, therefore, stated here.
1.

Plaintiffs.

All of the plaintiffs lived west of the belt route
(1-215) at the time of the flood. For purposes of the
litigation, it was assumed that they all sustained some
water damage.
2. Chronology.
A. County Storm Sewer. In 1964, at the request
of Salt Lake County, the engineering firm of Caldwell,
Eichards and Sorensen, Inc., prepared a master storm
drainage study of Salt Lake County. Included were
recommendations for a drainage system in the area of
Olympus Cove and the area west of Wasatch Boulevard
(Ex. 73 at p. 80). In preparing the recommendations the
following considerations were taken into account:
(1) The ultimate development in the county
projected to the year 2000 A.D.
(2) The contemplated (but unconstructed)
freeway.

3
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(3) Available rainfall intensity studies.
(4) The estimated runoff based upon a ten
year storm return frequency.
In 1966, the engineering firm of Nielsen and Maxwell prepared formal plans for a storm sewer line known
as "Big Cottonwood Storm Sewer J J, Unit No. 2 "
which would run from east to west on 4460 South. As
part of the plan, a lateral was designed to receive storm
water from the area known as Oak Cliff Drive. This
differed from the Caldwell, Bichards and Sorensen, Inc.,
Master Plan, primarily because the freeway plans had
then been formalized, calling for a temporary end of
the freeway at Oak Cliff Drive. The system was installed according to the Nielsen and Maxwell plans and
specifications. The storm drainage system was prepared
in accordance with acceptable engineering principles.
B. The Freeway Project. In the spring of 1968,
the contract for the construction of the freeway was
awarded to Gibbons & Eeed Construction Company. The
contract included by reference the Standard Specifications for Eoad and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue,
March 1968 (Ex. " B " ) . Further reference to the contract between the State and the contractor will be made
later. Construction called for removal and temporary
relocation of Wasatch Boulevard.
C. Floods.
(1) On April 3,1969, construction of the freeway was well underway. Utilities had been relocated
and structures were in various stages of completion.
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Large excavated sections of earth were exposed. The
drainage system of the freeway was partially installed.
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on that day it
began to rain. There is no evidence as to the amount of
rain which fell, but the storm was of moderate intensity. (See B. 1356-57). Plaintiff Kunkel reported some
flooding of his residential property which was located
immediately south of 400 South. This was in an area
substantially removed from the other plaintiffs in this
action and involved a separate incident.
(2) By Sunday, August 17, 1969, the freeway
project was nearing completion. The freeway drainage
system was installed, the ribbons of concrete roadway
surface were substantially in place, and the top-soil for
the cut-slopes had been placed prior to spreading. However, the cut-slopes were yet to be seeded for erosion
control and the concrete ditch liners in the median strip
and the gutters on either side of the freeway were not
in place. Nor had curb and gutter been installed on
the relocated Wasatch Boulevard. (B. 1475-76, 1487-88).
At approximately 5:15 p.m., a thunderstorm
began to move across the county from southwest to
northeast. (B. 1611). The storm was of unusual intensity. One observer in the area measured 2% inches of
rainfall in less than 45 minutes. (B. 1599-1600). According to historic rainfall intensity charts, based upon
rainfall in Salt Lake County from 1900 (Ex. 82-D, E.
1614), this was a storm which statistically would occur
less than once in every 100 years (Ex. 82-D, R.1267-80).
$
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Even the plaintiffs' expert could only document two
prior cloudbursts in the entire State of Utah that approached the magnitude of the August 17 storm. (R.
1310).
As the course of the storm progressed, surface water began to collect high in the Olympus Cove
area. It accumulated in ever increasing amounts, and by
the time it reached relocated Wasatch Boulevard, it was
of torrent proportions. {See Ex. 117-D).
Some water ran across Wasatch Boulevard,
cascaded down the fresh cut-slopes of the freeway project
and collected in the "grade-sag" at approximately 4600
South. The water carried with it huge amounts of silt,
dirt, gravel, and boulders, eroded from the cut-banks of
the freeway and from above Wasatch Boulevard.
The eroded material entered and partially
clogged the freeway drainage system and, in turn, clogged
the county storm sewer. The grade-sag finally became
full and the water poured over the west bank of the partially completed freeway and flooded the plaintiffs'
houses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY ENTERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SALT LAKE COUNTY.
A. THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO
GRANT JUDGMENT N.O.V. WHERE THE
. VERDICT IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.
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Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict. Whenever a motion for directed verdict
made at the close of all the evidence is denied or
for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed
to have submitted the action to the jury subject
to a later determination of the legal questions
raised by the motion. Not later than ten days
after entry of judgment, a party who has moved
for a directed verdict may move to have the
verdict and any judgment entered thereon set
aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict;
Defendant Salt Lake County made a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. The jury
returned its verdict on March 18, 1974. On March 27,
1974, defendant Salt Lake County filed its motion for
"Judgment in its Favor and Against the Plaintiffs."
(R.733).
The appellant's argument that this Motion does not
comply with Rule 50(b) is without merit. The rule does
not state that the Motion cannot be made before the
judgment; it says only that it cannot be made later than
10 days after judgment. The fact that the Motion was
not denominated "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict," or that it was filed before the formal
judgment was entered does not render it ineffective.
The plain fact is that the Motion was timely filed by
defendant iSalt Lake County and seeks judgment in its
favor, notwithstanding the adverse jury verdict. (R. 733).
The trial court in entering judgment in favor of Salt
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Lake County acted within the clear intent of Rule 50(b).
This principle was succinctly stated in Bunting Tractor
Co. v. Emmett D. Ford Contractors Inc., 2 Utah 2d 275,
272 P.2d 191 (1954):
In entering any judgment it is the duty of the
court to make such order, not inconsistent with
the law, as will effectuate justice. . . . This policy
is not an innovation to our law. It has long been
embodies in both statutes and decisions that deviation from formal procedure shall not work a
forfetiure of substantive rights in the absence of
prejudice to the opposing party.
B. THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE JURY FINDINGS AGAINST SALT
LAKE COUNTY.
The essential elements of a cause of action of this
nature were defined in Samford v. University of Utah,
26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). The plaintiffs'
assertion that the evidence against Salt Lake County
brings this case squarely within the holding of Samford
is inaccurate.
1. Change in the natural flow of surface water.
Stated in the plaintiffs' brief (Brief for Appellant at
20-21), and undisputed by the evidence, is the fact that
the freeway project changed the natural flow of drainage. While this is unquestionably true, there is no evidence or assertion that Salt Lake County was involved
in any way with authorizing or constructing the freeway. This was entirely a State project.
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In an effort to establish this element, the plaintiffs rely upon the fact that the County permitted the
State of Utah to connect the freeway drainage system
to the Salt Lake County storm sewer. This certainly
did not change the natural flow of surface water; the
natural flow was already changed by the construction
of the freeway. The county's conduct did not cause
any damage. In fact, it is obvious that the freeway
drainage system being connected to the storm sewer
diminished the flooding problem by carrying away a
substantial portion of the runoff.
2. Creation of a drainage system. The evidence
clearly indicates that Salt Lake County carefully planned, designed, and constructed a storm sewer system in
an attempt to alleviate a critical drainage problem in
the Olympus Hills area.
The evidence indicates that the storm sewer was
designed according to the best engineering principles
and practices (E. 1706, 1707), and it is obvious that
without the storm sewer system the residents in the
area below Olympus Hills would have suffered considerably more damage than they did in the storm of August
17,1969.
The plaintiffs attempt to prove that Salt Lake
County participated in the freeway project by showing
that several Salt Lake County officials attended a preconstruction conference held on May 29, 1968. There is
no dispute that these individuals were present at the
meeting and that several potential problems with sur9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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face water drainage were recognized and reviewed. The
construction was to be undertaken by Gibbons & Reed
pursuant to plans and specifications, which the jury
found were not defective (R. 728, Interrog. H). The
State was to supervise the contractor to assure compliance. Salt Lake County had no active responsibility nor
jurisdiction in connection with the freeway project. With
out joint conferences of this nature, planning and coordinating the construction of major public improvements
would be impossible. Salt Lake County extended every
cooperation to the iState to permit construction of the
freeway section with as little inconvenience and risk as
possible to its citizens. Rather, attendance at such meeting is an evidence of Salt Lake County's due care in
connection with the freeway project.
3. Creation of a defective or dangerous condition.
The plaintiffs attempt in their brief to show that the
storm sewer constructed by Salt Lake County was dangerous and defective. However, all of the evidence indicated that the storm sewer system, itself, was constructed in accordance with sound engineering practices.
Not even the plaintiffs' experts contended that the storm
sewer system, standing alone, was defective or inadequate. Rather, the plaintiffs? experts said that, in their
opinion, the drainage system of the freeway itself should
have been protected by gratings to prevent the entrance
of boulders and gravel. (Brief for Appellants at 23).
The plaintiffs do not claim that it was the duty or prerogative of Salt Lake County to instruct or supervise
the State of Utah, in designing the freeway drainage
system, whether protective gratings should be used. In
10
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any event the jury found the State's plans were not
defective. Further, counties are subdivisions of the
State, and as such are subservient to the State. Salt
Lake County v. Liquor Control Commission, 11 Utah 2d
235, 357 P.2d 488 (1960).
Plaintiffs claim that Salt Lake County participated in creating a defective or dangerous condition in
nine ways (Brief for Appellants at 26).
Plaintiffs' allegations will be answered in the
order in which they have been presented in appellants'
brief:
(1) " [ I ] t failed totally to maintain its storm
drain system.''
This allegation is without foundation. The system had fully and properly functioned prior to the storm
of August 17 (R. 1687, 1727). An inspection following
the storm revealed that it ceased to function properly
because large boulders and gravel, which had been forced
through lateral lines on the freeway drainage system,
had plugged the 36" county line. There was no evidence
that the plugging was caused from any lack of proper
maintenance or that any prior reasonable maintenance
would have prevented the plugging.
(2) [I]t failed to determine whether Line 0
when connected was free from obstruction."
After Line C was connected with the State freeway lines the sewer system functioned completely sat11
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isfactorily. Several rain showers had occurred after it
was connected and the unobstructed passage of runoff
waters was clearly evident (R. 1687, 1727). The plaintiffs did not present any evidence that Line C was obstructed prior to the storm of August 17. It is an imposition on the court to urge this point.
(3) " [ I ] t failed to require that lead intakes
were protected from accepting debris and rocks."
Plaintiffs introduced some speculative evidence
to the effect that the lateral drains within the freeway
should have been granted to prevent debris from entering. However, the State of Utah highway engineers testified that such grating device were not specified in the
plans because engineering technique and experience demonstrates that they are not needed on controlled access
highways, and to some extent they impede the intake
flow of runoff water. (R. 1743-45; 1768-69). The engineers indicated that such gratings are usually provided
in connection with under-highway culverts where debris
from a natural channel is expected.
Although the plans provided by the State did
not require grates, the jury specifically found that the
plans and specifications were not defective. (R. 728, Interrog. H). Plaintiffs 1 claim that Salt Lake County is
liable for failing to require grates is therefore without
merit.
It should be noted that the contractor agreed
as a part of its construction responsibility to " protect
the Project" during construction. (Ex. D, Sheet No. 1).
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If any duty existed to prevent boulders, gravel and silt
from entering the storm drainage system during construction of the freeway as a result of the storm of
August 17, it was that of the contractor.
(4) " [ I ] t permitted rocks and debris to enter
the system.''
This allegation is merely a restatement of the
claimed deficiency enumerated in (3). Obviously, there
can be no legal fault assigned where no duty exists.
(5) " [W]hen the County agreed to the connection with its line, it knew it had constructed Line C with
a very flat grade.''
There was no evidence presented which supports
any claim that Line C was not designed and constructed
in accordance with acceptable engineering standards. The
fact that a section of this line clogged because rocks and
gravel became lodged in it does not establish liability.
Obviously, it would not have become plugged had the
rocks and gravel not entered the line. Therefore, this
claim is a restatement of claim (3) and is a belabored
attempt to assign fault where none exists.
(6) " [ I ] t permitted the State to connect a
larger drainpipe upstream to a smaller pipe."
The State of Utah, out of an abundance of caution, replaced a section of the 36" county line which
passed under the area where the freeway was constructed, with a 42" line. There is no evidence which would
13
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support a finding that had this not been done the clogging would have been prevented.
(7) " [ I ] t permitted the State to drain runoff
water into a system which was already inadequate."
When the engineers prepared the plans and specifications for the storm drainage system which was to
serve the area here involved, the anticipated maximum
development of the area, projected to 2000 A.D., was
considered, as well as the eventual construction of the
freeway. Estimates of anticipated runoff were made
and pipe capacities were determined utilizing the acceptable standard of a ten year storm return frequency.
Plaintiffs' experts did not have any quarrel with this
design criteria. All available data was utilized in arriving at the engineering estimates upon which the plans
were based. The freeway was constructed after the
County storm drainage system was installed As noted
above, the system as designed contemplated drainage
from a section of the freeway. When the freeway was
designed the estimated runoff could then be more accurately determined. When the estimated freeway runoff was added to the anticipated ten year storm return
frequency runoff from county property, the design capacity of the County system was slightly exceeded, but
the expected combined runoff was within the as built
capacity of the system. (B. 1700-1706). Of course, if a
storm exceeds the intensity for which the system was
designed, some flooding is to be expected. The storm of
August 17 was more than a "100 year" storm and greatly
exceeded the capacity of the system. Even so, had the
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lines not become plugged, there is no evidence that the
County storm system would not have handled a sufficient quantity of the runoff to have prevented the flooding of which plaintiffs complain. Neither is there any
satisfactory evidence in the record that the system as
built was insufficient to handle the reasonably expected
runoff from a ten year storm.
(8) " [I]t relied upon unsound data."
The essence of this claim is stated in claim (7).
However, to set this allegation in its proper setting the
following statement appears appropriate:
During all of the approximately 100 years in
which rainfall data has been accumulated by the United
States weather gathering services, the stations have been
located in the downtown Salt Lake City area. Until fairly
recently such information has not been accumulated in
the canyon areas near the mountains. The engineers
used isohyetal maps and rainfall data as published by
the National Weather Service whose background data
was gathered as noted above. Plaintiffs claim this information was unreliable because it did not take into
account the possibility that heavier rainfall occurs near
the east mountains surrounding the city. They do not,
however, suggest what data the engineers should have
used, since no other data existed. Further, no satisfactory evidence was introduced indicating that acceptable
engineering practice in designing storm drainage systems would have excluded the use of such data. The
evidence by all engineers who had constructed similar
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drainage systems, was that such data was invariably
used.
Additionally, there was no evidence offered
which would support a finding that had some other rainfall data been used, the flooding in this case would have
been prevented or diminished.
(9) " [ I ] t permitted the removal of protective
diking and curbing.''
This claim relates entirely to the construction
phase of the project by the State's contractor, Gibbons
& Eeed. This reference is apparently to an asphalt curb
on old Wasatch Boulevard which was removed as a part
of the construction of relocated Wasatch Boulevard.
The contractor had the duty under its contract, to protect the work during construction. This was a matter
between the State and its contractor concerning which
Salt Lake County had no duty or right of supervision
or control. Further, the plaintiffs can point to no evidence which would support a finding that the removal
of the curb caused the flooding.
Plaintiffs point to the above nine items to establish
that Salt Lake County participated in the creation of a
dangerous and defective condition.
Two of these relate to the maintenance of the storm
sewer system prior to the August 17 flood. (1 & 2) But
plaintiffs do not point to a scrap of evidence to indicate
that lack of maintenance of the storm sewer system had
any relationship to the flood on August 17.
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Six of the nine are allegations that Salt Lake
County permitted the State or its contractor to engage
in various activities. (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9). However, the
County had no right of supervision or control over the
State of Utah or its contractor Gibbons & Reed. The
County did extend cooperation to the State prior to and
during the construction, but in so doing the County did
not assume responsibility for the acts of the State or
its contractor. Further, such conduct falls within the
"discretionary function'' exemption of the Governmental
Immunity Act. This provision will be discussed later
in this brief.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that Salt Lake County
relied on unsound data to predict storm intensity (8).
But never do plaintiffs claim that any superior data
was available or that reliance upon the data used was
not in conformance with accepted engineering standards.
4. Salt Lake County's awareness of the danger. The
plaintiffs' contention that Salt Lake County was fully
aware of the possible flooding danger in this case is a
misstatement of the evidence.
Olympus Hills was a rapidly growing suburban area
in Salt Lake County. Certainly, Salt Lake County was
aware that whenever the natural vegetation is removed
from hillsides and replaced with homes, driveways and
other structures, a greater runoff factor is created. This
was taken into account by the engineers in designing
the storm sewer system. But plaintiffs cannot point to
any evidence in the record to indicate that Salt Lake
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County had prior knowledge of, or that would justify
the court in charging it with the numerous single occurring elements which combined to create the flooding
in this case.
Each of the plaintiffs testified that they had never
sustained damage from, surface water runoff in the past.
(Brief for Appellants at 9; E. 826, 835, 846, 855, 860,
880, 954, 980, 1018, 1024, 1058, 1063, 1078, 1432). Plaintiff Paul Kunkel did inform the County of a flooding
problem prior to August 17, 1969, but this cannot be
construed as notice to the County of any problem that
caused the August 17 flood. Plaintiff Kunkel lives in
an entirely different area from the other plaintiffs and
his damage was caused by a completely different set of
circumstances.
Plaintiffs also rely on a newspaper article of July
31, 1965, as an evidence of the County's knowledge of
rainfall potential in the area. (Brief for Appellants at
28). The admission of this exhibit was based upon
hearsay and was highly prejudicial. Defendant properly objected to its admission (E, 1843). But even so,
the fact that a storm of similar intensity to that of
August 17, had previously occurred does not affect the
right of the County to rely upon the adequacy of plans
and specifications prepared by qualified engineers it
has employed for the purpose of designing storm drainage facilities. There was no attempt to show that the
storm sewer plans did not meet reasonable engineering standards, or that the County was negligent in relying upon them.
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The evidence indicated that the flood was caused
by a rainstorm of unusual intensity at a time when the
freeway was especially vulnerable to flooding. Whatever
knowledge Salt Lake County had of possible flooding
danger from other sources, there is no evidence that
Salt Lake County was aware of, or should be charged
with knowledge of, the danger that caused this flood.
5. The plaintiffs' injuries. For the purpose of this
trial it was assumed that each of the plaintiffs had been
damaged.
C. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS IMMUNE FROM
SUIT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section
63-30-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) provides :
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act,
all governmental entities shall be immune from
suit for any injury which may result from the
activities of said entities wherein said entity is
engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. (Sec. 63-30-3).
The Act then waives immunity in several broad
areas, including dangerous condition of highways, culverts, etc, Sec. 63-30-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), dangerous condition of structures and public
improvements, Sec. 63-30-9, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), and negligent acts or omissions of employees,
Sec. 63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). This
waiver of immunity, however, is not an admission of
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liability. The plaintiff nrnst still establish liability as
in cases against individuals. The statute states:
. . . [C]onsent to be sued is granted and liability
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity
were a private person. Sec. 63-30-4, Utah Code
Ann. (1953 as amended).
This court, in Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah
2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971) set out the three theories
of recovery in a case of this nature:
An action for the invasion of a person's interest
in the private use and enjoyment of his land is
an action for private nuisance.
Any of three types of conduct may result in liability for private nuisance. . . . Liability for
nuisance may rest upon an intentional invasion
of the plaintiff's interests, or a negligent one,
or conduct which is abnormal and out of place
in the surroundings, and so falls fairly within the
principal of strict liability. 26 Utah 2d at 291-92,
488 P.2d at 745.
In Sanford, there had been a previous flood caused
by the same condition. The court relied upon knowledge
of this prior flood to conclude that the invasion of the
plaintiff's interest was intentional in the sense that:
defendant has created or continued the condition
causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the
harm to the plaintiff's interest is substantially
certain to follow. 26 Utah 2d at 291, 488 P.2d at
745.
The present case differs from Sanford in that in
this case the plaintiffs have never alleged nor proved
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that the defendants proceeded with the full knowledge
that harm to the plaintiffs' interest was substantially
certain to follow. Rather, they claim that the defendants, or their employees were negligent in failing to
properly construct 1-215 and the storm sewer system.
Because the plaintiffs rely on negligence as an essential element of their cause of action, they also must
rely on the waiver of immunity for negligence in Sec.
63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). And they
are bound by the exceptions to immmunity in that section.
1. Salt Lake County is immune when the exercise of a discretionary function is involved. Sec.
63-30-10(1) preserves political subdivisions' governmental immunity for a discretionary function. That section provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his employment except
if the injury:
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion
is abused,...
In Velasquez v. Union Pac. RR., 24 Utah 2d 217,
469 P.2d 5 (1970) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted
this provision. The court there held that failure of the
Utah Public Service Commission to require less than the
most improved warning sign available at a railroad
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crossing was a discretionary function and would not give
rise to liability.
Conversely, in Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496
P.2d 888 (1972), this court held that the decision of a
road supervisor to use earthen berms as a means of
warning drivers of an abandoned road was not a discretionary function. In so holding, the court stated:
In the instant action, the decision of the road
supervisor to use berms as a sole means of protection for the unwary traveler was not a basic
policy decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of some basic governmental policy,
program, or objective. His decision did not require the exercise of basic policy evaluation,
judgment and expertise on the part of the Eoad
Commission. His determination may properly be
characterized as one at the operational level of
decision making. 27 Utah 2d at 389-90, 496 P.2d
at 891.
In so holding the Utah court followed the numerous
federal cases that apply the "operational-policy" distinction that determines whether a function is discretionary for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. 2671, et seq., a statute after which the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act was clearly patterned. See,
e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953);
Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 (I). Alas. 1962).
Plaintiffs' claims against Salt Lake County fall
within one of the following claimed areas of deficiency:
(1) Failure to properly inspect the system; (2) Its
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agreement with the State in which freeway drainage
was tied into the County system; (3) Failure to supervise and control the State's project; and (4) Reliance
upon certain engineering data which was included in the
storm drainage plans approved by the County Commission. With the exception of (1), which will be considered later, such actions were clearly not taken at the
"operational level," but involved the exercise of basic
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise and are "discretionary functions" as defined in the Act. And insofar as category (3) is concerned, the County had no
right of control or supervision over the State's project.
2. Salt Lake County is not liable for failure to
inspect. Sec. 63-30-10(4), Utah Code Ann. (1963 as
amended) provides another exception from liability when
the action upon which liability is based: "arises out of
a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property,..."
As noted above, there is no evidence that Salt
Lake County knew of any dangerous condition in its
storm sewer system, even if one were shown •*» i-xist.
Neither can plaintiffs contend that the County should
have known of such a dangerous condition by conducting an inspection. To the extent plaintiffs base their
action upon Salt Lake County's failure to inspect, they
are barred by Sec. 63-30-10(4), Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended). In any event, there is no evidence that
an inspection, even if conducted, would have revealed
any dangerous defect in the system.

23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RECOVER UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION.
Inverse condemnation is an action brought against
a governmental entity to recover the value of property
which has been appropriated without the formal exercise of the eminent domain power. Ossma/n v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 511 P.2d 517, 519
(Colo. App. 1973); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233
Ore. 178, 375 P.2d 100 (1962).
The plaintiffs do not have a right of recovery under
the facts of this case apart from the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq.).
The law in Utah was clearly stated by Mr. Justice
Henriod in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County,, 10 Utah 2d
417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). In that case the Utah Road
Commission reduced the grade of a highway to about
16 feet below the abutting owner's land. Consequently,
access to the property was limited and the value reduced accordingly. In reversing the trial court's denial
of a motion to dismiss the court held:
[Consistently and historically we have ruled . . .
that Art. I Sec, 22 of our Constitution is not
self-executing, nor does it give consent to be sued,
implied or otherwise; and that to secure such
consent is a legislative matter
This doctrine was followed consistently in every case
that put the issue before this Court. E.g., Holt v. Utah
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State Road Comnrn., 30 uian 2<± -±, oil i\2u 12bb v.1973);
Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968).
The Court wisely forbore assessing damages against
the State or its subdivisions until the will of the people
could be expressed by the legislature. If the Court were
now to hold that a governmental entity is liable for
negligent property injury outside of and beyond the Governmental Immunity Act, ii *<>i\Ui U* substituting its
own judgment for that of the legislature. As Mr. Justice
Crockett said in Hjorth v. Whittenburgf 1.21 Utah 324,
241 P.2d 907, 909 (1953):
This phase of our law is well established and of
long standing. If it is to be changed, that must
come through the sovereign power of this commonwealth, the people, speaking through the legislature.
1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE STATE.
The jury found that the "highway project created
by the State of Utah was unreasonably defective or dangerous.' J (R. 727). As a result of this finding the trial
court entered judgment against the State.
The State did noi "create" the conditions which
plaintiffs claim gave rise to the flooding. Rather, the
State planned the project and engaged Gibbons & Reed
to construct the highway who thereafter failed to properly "protect the project" during construction. (R. 782,
25
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Interrog. J ) . The contract called for a completed facility.
The State provided plans and specifications which the
jury specifically found were not defective in any way.
(R. 728, Interog. H) The planning of 1-215 is clearly a
discretionary function, and since there was no showing
of negligence which can be properly attributed to the
state, the judgment against it should^be permitted to
stand.
A. THE JURY DID NOT FIND THAT THE
STATE OF UTAH WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.
As stated above, in relationship to Salt Lake County,
in order for a governmental entity to be liable, the
plaintiff must show that :
(1) liability would exist if the entity were a private person, Sec. 63-30-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended) and
(2) that immunity is waived under either Sec.
63-30-8 or 63-30-9 or 63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended). In addition, if the plaintiff relies on the
waiver of immunity under Sec. 63-30-10, he must show
that his action does not fall within one of the exceptions
thereunder.
As noted above, in a case of this nature, plaintiffs
must prove their case under one of three theories: the
invasion must be intentional; or it must be negligent;
or it must be so unusual as to give rise to strict liability.
In this case the plaintiffs do not claim that the invasion of their interest was intentional. Nor do they
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claim that freeway construction is a proper case for
strict liability. Bather, they base their action on negligence.
The jury, however, did not find that the State of
Utah was negligent. The trial court submitted 16 interrogatories to the jury under the special verdict. Three
of these related to the State. In Interrogatory " H ? ;h^
jury specifically found that the plans which tlu* Slate
provided were in accordance with approved engineering standards. (R. 728). In Interrogatories "A** :wl
" D " the jury found that the highway project wais m
reasonably defective or dangerous. (E. 721, 727). A
finding of "unreasonably defective and dangerous" does
not establish a cause of action against a private person.
Nor does a finding of i l unreasonably defective and dangerous" establish negligence. Such a finding is the hallmark of strict liability. See, Restatement of Torts, Second, §402A. Although such a finding may be in some
circumstances a basis for liability, such as in the sale
of a dangerous product, it is not applicable to facts surrounding the construction of a freeway by the State, as
contemplated under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.
B. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY WAS N OT
WAIVED FOR THE PLANNING OF 1-215,
SINCE PLANNING IS A DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION.
Because plaintiffs rely upon negligence as the basis
for their cause of action, the exceptions listed in Sec.
63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), are applicable. Subsection (1) provides that negligent acts or
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omissions of an employee of a governmental entity committed within the scope of his employment is waived
" . . . except if the injury: (1) arises out of the exercise
or performance or the failure to perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused,....'-'
This provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act was patterned after Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. 2671, et. seq., so federal cases are instructive.
Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 (D. Alaska
1962) was a case brought under the Tort Claims Act
almost identical on its facts to the one at the bar. The
plaintiffs there had been injured by a flood caused by
defective drainage in a highway built by the United
States. The Court held:
Plaintiffs concede that the acts of constructing
the highway and deciding where the highway
should be built are discretionary functions, but
contend that when the government undertakes an
act it may not be negligent in the performance
thereof or must exercise due care, in what the
Supreme Court has characterized as the "operational level" of governmental activity.

,.
v

v

Clearly the acts here complained of relating to
the planning of the construction of the grade
and culverts in the improvement of the Glenn
Highway are not negligent acts committed by a
Government employee on the "operational level"
but are acts calling for the exercise of judgment
and discretion in the planning of the highway.
Errors in judgment, if such may be found, are
not negligence in construction. These plans were
the result of policy judgment and decision and
as we have noted, where there is room for such
there is discretion. This view conforms to what
28
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is believed to be the true intent of this important
exception. Otherwise the Government would be
liable to a property owner for every error of
judgment in the planning and construction of
public roads. 202 F. Supp. at 274-75.
The Utah Supreme Court has also adopted this
operational-planning'' distinction in Carroll v. State,
27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).
i4

When the legislature chose to except from liability
negligent acts that arise out of discretionary functions,
it recognized that enormous projects such as freeway
construction may not be accomplished without the pos
sibility of harm to some individuals. Nevertheless, the
legislature recognized that the common good requires
that such projects be built. It, therefore, excepted from
liability, negligent acts in the planning of such projects
so that the state would not "be liable to a property
owner for every error of judgment in the planning and
construction of public roads." Sisley v. United States,
202 F. Supp. at 275.
The decisions that were mat le here involved the
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise on the part of the State. Such factors as relative cost, safety, maintenance expense, and feasibility
had to be carefully weighed. The Court should recognize the policy decision made by the Utah Legislature
in making the State immune from suit in this discretionary area and should not hold the State liable for the
planning of 1-215.
0. THE STATE OF UTAH CANNOT BE HELD
LIABLE FOR INADEQUATE INSPECTION.
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In addition to planning 1-215, the only other aspect
in which the State became involved was general inspection and supervision to assure the project was completed
according to the plans and specifications. To the extent the plaintiffs rely upon any failure of the State
to make inspection, or making a negligent inspection,
their action is barred by Sec. 63-30-10(4), Utah Code
Ann. (1953 as amended), which preserves immunity in
such instances.
Because all activities in which the State was engaged in this project — planning and inspection — are
areas of immunity under the Governmental Immunity
Act, the judgment against the State cannot stand.
POINT IV

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENTERING
JUDGMENT FOR INDEMNITY AGAINST
GIBBONS & REED COMPANY.
The contract between the State of Utah and Gibbons & Reed Construction Company for the construction of the highway incorporated by reference the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction,
Interim Issue, March 1968 (Ex. D, Sheet No. 1).
Those Standard Specifications provide in part as
follows:
107.14 Responsibility for Damage Claims: The
Contractor shall indemnify and save harmless
the 'State, its officers, and employees, from all
suits, actions, or claims of any character brought
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because of any injuries or damage received or
sustained by any person, persons, or property on
account of the operations of the said Contractor;
or on account of or in consequence of any neglect
in safeguarding the work; . .. (Emphasis added).
Indemnity agreements, like all other contracts, are
construed with a view to determining the actual intention of the parties. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. Ventura
Pipe Line Const. Co., 309 P.2d 849, 851 (Cal App. 1957);
Luke v. American Surety Co., 114 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1941).
As stated in 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, §13:
A contract of indemnity is construed in accordance with the rules for the construction of contracts generally. The cardinal rule is id ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention if it can be done consistently with legal principles. To do this, it has
been held that the courts must consider not only
the language of the contract, but the facts and
surrounding circumstances under which the contract was made. Of course, where the terms of
the contract are considered by the court to be
clear and unequivocal, no question of construing
or interpreting the agreement arises.
Contracts of indemnity, if ambiguous or uncertain, must receive a reasonable construction so
as to carry out rather than defeat the purpose
for which they were executed. To this end they
should neither, on the one hand, be so narrowly
or technically interpreted as to frustrate their
obvious design, nor, on the other hand, so loosely
or inartificially interpreted as to relieve the obligor from a liability within the scope or spirit of
their terms.
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Manifestly, the intention of the contract provision
in this case is to protect the State from suits exactly
like this one. Nothing could be a better example of
"damage received or sustained by any person, persons,
or property on account of the operations of the said
Contractor," than a flood caused by the construction of
the highway. This alone should be enough to require indemnification under the contract.
The Utah court has consistently held that if a contract of indemnity is to relieve a party of its own negligence, that intention must be clearly and unequivocably
expressed. Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205,
398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso
Nat, Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 555, 259, 408 P.2d 910, 913
(1965); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263,
264, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (1966).
In each of these cases the party seeking indemnification was guilty of active negligence and the party
against whom indemnity was sought was wholly without
negligence. In contrast, in this case, the contractor had
control of the instrumentality causing the damage and
was guilty of primary negligence. Furthermore the jury
did not find that the State was negligent. Rather the
jury found that the highway project was unreasonably
defective or dangerous. The reasonable conclusion to
be drawn from the jury finding that the project was
"unreasonably defective or dangerous" in light of its
further finding that the plans and specifications were
prepared in accordance with approved engineering
standards (E. 728), is that the negligence of Gibbons &
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Beed in failing
tect the project
effective, if not
Interrog. J ) .

to take reasonable precautions to produring construction was the active and
the sole cause, of the flooding. (R. 728,
•
;•""• • •
CONCLUSION

The trial court properly entered judgment for Salt
Lake County because there was no evidence that Salt
Lake County was negligeni in failing to provide adequate drainage facilities. Furthermore, all the activities undertaken by Salt Lake County in connection with
the freeway project were either discretionary in nature
or exempt from liability under the "inspection" provisions of Section 10 of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.
The trial court erred in entering judgment against
the State of Utah because there was no satisfactory evidence that the State of Utah created a dangerous condition. The State's only activities in connection with
the construction of the freeway were planning and inspection. The jury found that the plans and specifications provided by the State were in accordance with approved engineering standards. Additionally, highway
planning is a discretionary function and cannot serve
as a basis for liability under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. Neither can plaintiffs rely on the failure to make an inspection, or
making a negligent
inspection, 1»y the State of Utah a> a basi* for liability,
because immunity for such conduct is preserved by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Further, there was
33
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no evidence offered which would support such a finding
in any event.
Defendant Gibbons & Reed constructed the project, and under its contract with the State unequivocally
agreed to indemnify the State for damages the State
may incur because of the contractor's activities during
contraction and specifically for any failure to protect
the project. The jury found that Gibbons & Reed failed
to "protect the project" during construction and that
such was a proximate cause of the flooding and damage.
It is respectfully submitted that if plaintiffs are
entitled to recover, their remedy is exclusively against
Defendant, Gibbons & Reed.
Finally, if it is determined that the State has liability to the plaintiffs this Court should grant judgment
in favor of the State of Utah on its crossclaim against
Gibbons & Reed, because of the indemnity contract between Gibbons & Reed and the State.
Respectfully submitted,

Y
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MERLIN R, LYBBERT
DAVID W. SLAGLE
7th Floor, Continental Bank
Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents, State of Utah
and Salt Lake County
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